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On approach to competitive situations, affective states (emotions and anxiety) occur
through the complex interaction of cognitive antecedents. Researchers have intimated
that irrational beliefs might play an important role in the relationship between cognitive
appraisals and affective states, but has ignored challenge and threat. In the current
research, we examine the interaction between cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and
challenge and threat to predict golfers’ pre-competitive affective states. We adopted
a cross-sectional atemporal design to examine how golfers approached two different
competitive situations: imagined imminent golf competition (phase 1), and actual future
golf competition (phase 2). Path analysis revealed how cognitive appraisals, irrational
beliefs, and challenge and threat interact to predict affective states among golfers. Serial
atemporal multiple mediation analysis indicated that the relationships between cognitive
appraisals and affective states were mediated by irrational beliefs and challenge and
threat. Further, some differences were revealed between phase 1 and phase 2 in the
serial multiple atemporal mediation results with regard to challenge. That is, at phase
1 no significant serial mediation was found for any affective outcomes, but at phase
2 significant serial mediation was found for all affective states, showing that irrational
beliefs and challenge serial mediated the associations between cognitive appraisals and
affective states. The finding that mediation and bivariate associations differed across
phase 1 and phase 2 is echoed in the phase 1-phase 2 tests of differences. The current
research makes a theoretical advancement by elucidating in more detail the complex
interaction between cognitive antecedents and mediators of affective states. Specifically,
the inclusion of challenge and threat alongside irrational beliefs and cognitive appraisals
is an important theoretical advancement that builds on work inside of sport literature
(e.g., Dixon et al., 2016) and outside of sport literature (e.g., David et al., 2002, 2005),
as this constellation of theoretically related antecedents of affective states has not been
examined together in the extant research.
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INTRODUCTION
For individuals taking part in sport, the anticipation time prior
to stressful situations such as a sporting competition (Neil
et al., 2011) is often daunting due to an over emphasis on
winning and uncertainty of the outcome (Folkman and Lazarus,
1985). Athletes’ pre-competitive anticipatory psychological states
have been the focus of much research, and competition
anxiety is one of the most studied areas in the discipline
of sport psychology (Mellalieu et al., 2006). There are a
number of frameworks that attempt to explain the occurrence
of pre-competitive emotions (Jones and Uphill, 2012), but
one underexplored framework that is growing in the sport
literature (Turner, 2016) is Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy
(REBT; Ellis, 1957).
REBT is considered to be the original cognitive behavioral
therapy (CBT), and was developed by Albert Ellis in 1955,
inspired by ancient philosophers, particularly the Stoic
philosopher Epictetus (1948) who proclaimed in The Enchiridion:
“men are not disturbed by things, but by the view which they take
of them.” Ellis (1994) developed a framework for understanding
and treating psychological disturbance known as the GABC
framework. In this framework, individual goals, values, and
desires (G), that are thwarted or obstructed by events and
situations (A), can trigger healthy or unhealthy emotional and
behavioral consequences (C), depending on one’s beliefs (B)
about the self, others, and the world in relation to the situation
(A). If an individual’s beliefs are rational (flexible, logical, and
non-extreme) then healthy emotions and adaptive behaviors will
occur. In contrast, if an individual’s beliefs are irrational (rigid,
illogical, and extreme) then unhealthy emotions and maladaptive
behaviors will occur (Szentagotai and Jones, 2010). As such,
irrational beliefs have attracted much research attention (e.g.,
Visla et al., 2016).
Within REBT, irrational and rational beliefs are the core
constructs that mediate between what we experience, and
our emotional responses. Since its inception in 1955 (Ellis,
1957), REBT has included irrational beliefs as the fundamental
cognitions that determine psychological ill-being. In sport and
exercise literature, irrational beliefs as posited in REBT have
been the subject of enquiry more recently (Turner et al., 2019a),
and data indicates that irrational beliefs are a risk factor for
mental illness in athletes (Turner, 2016). In the current paper,
we seek to gain a deeper and more complex understanding
of how irrational beliefs determine athlete affective states
(emotions and anxiety).
In REBT, it is suggested that individuals often adopt
irrational beliefs in situations that are of utmost importance
to them. Irrational beliefs have been consistently associated
with various types of emotional distress (Visla et al., 2016),
with the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and
anxiety being particularly strong (r = 0.41). Importantly, the
association between irrational beliefs and anxiety is stronger
when a stressful event is real, actually present, and is
personally relevant, as opposed to being experimentally induced,
absent, and not personally relevant. In sport, higher irrational
beliefs have been found to be related to greater emotional
and physical exhaustion (Turner and Moore, 2015), and
anxiety, anger, and depression (Turner et al., 2019b). Also,
irrational beliefs have been targeted for intervention in athletes
experiencing heightened anxiety (Turner and Barker, 2013;
Turner et al., 2018a).
Although in the extant literature irrational beliefs have
been found to be associated with dysfunctional emotions and
maladaptive behaviors (see Turner, 2016 for a review), the precise
mechanisms that explain how irrational beliefs lead to emotional
and behavioral dysfunction has not yet been fully elucidated.
Over the years REBT has grown into a well-established CBT,
but it remains less visible in the mainstream study of emotion
due to lack of experimental rigor (Still, 2001; David et al., 2002;
Padesky and Beck, 2003). There is a growing body of research
that places irrational beliefs within the conceptual framework of
cognitive appraisal theory (CAT; Lazarus, 1991; David et al., 2002,
2005) in order to advance Ellis’s cognitive theory of emotion.
Therefore, the main purpose of the current study is to examine
irrational beliefs as part of cognitive appraisals in the prediction
of pre-competitive affective states.
Past literature has intimated that irrational beliefs might play
an important role in cognitive appraisals (David et al., 2002,
2005). According to Lazarus’ CAT (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984;
Lazarus, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1993), information processing
includes a transaction between the goals of the individual
and the representation of environmental encounters. This
transaction can be appraised as harmful, beneficial, threatening
or challenging. The CAT comprises primary appraisals, which
are concerned with the extent to which the encounter is
relevant to one’s well-being, and secondary appraisals which
concerns one’s resources and options for coping with the
encounter (Smith and Lazarus, 1993). Specifically, primary
appraisal includes motivational relevance (MR; evaluation of the
extent to which the encounter is relevant to one’s goals) and
motivational congruence (MC; evaluation of the extent to which
the encounter is consistent with one’s goals). In anticipation of
stressors, the components of secondary appraisal are problem-
focused coping potential (PFC; evaluations of one’s ability to
act directly on the situation to bring it in accord with one’s
goals), and emotion focused coping potential (EFC; evaluations
of one’s ability to psychologically adjust to the situation by
altering one’s interpretations, desires, or beliefs; Smith and
Lazarus, 1993). The primary and secondary appraisals combine
to form different core-relational themes that result in emotions.
For anxiety, the core relational theme is uncertain, existential
threat (Lazarus, 1991) where primary appraisals of high MR
and low MC combine with secondary appraisals of low EFC
(Smith and Lazarus, 1993).
Researchers have explored the links between irrational beliefs
and cognitive appraisals, finding that anxiety is most effectively
predicted by a combination of high MR, low MC, low EFC, and
irrational beliefs (David et al., 2002, 2005). Clearly, there are some
demonstrable relationships between the concepts of irrational
beliefs proposed by Ellis, and CAT proposed by Lazarus. Ellis
and Lazarus recognized this potential relationship in their works,
with Ellis recognizing the influence of Lazarus on his thinking
(Ellis, 1994), and with Lazarus explicitly addressing the overlap
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between REBT and the Lazarusian CAT (Lazarus, 1989). To
explain the potential links between REBT and the CAT, Ziegler
(2001) suggests that cognitive appraisals (both primary and
secondary) are thoroughly couched in, and interconnected with,
beliefs in the GABC model. For example, a golfer is anticipating
the tee-off for an important competition with a lucrative reward
(reflecting G in the REBT model, and MR in the CAT). The
golfer has not competed in such a prestigious event before and
is unsure whether he will perform well (reflecting A in the REBT
model, and low MC in the CAT) and believes that he absolutely
must perform well and he could not tolerate underperforming
(reflecting irrational beliefs in the REBT model). Because the
prospect of underperforming (A) is rendered highly dangerous
to his goals (G) by the irrational beliefs, the golfer is likely to
appraise the situation as a threat (Lazarus, 1999). If the golfer
believes that he cannot psychologically adjust to the encounter
(low EFC), and is not flexible in his coping abilities (Ziegler,
2001), then he is more likely to experience dysfunctional anxiety
(David et al., 2002) in anticipation of the tee-off. Importantly,
cognitive appraisals and irrational beliefs are seen as co-
occurring simultaneously rather than occurring in a sequential
and fixed order.
Within a sporting context, researchers have investigated the
association between irrational beliefs and challenge and threat,
finding irrational beliefs to be positively associated with threat
and no association to be found with challenge (Dixon et al., 2016).
Similarly, another study (Evans et al., 2018) found that soccer
athletes who received a rational team talk (promoting rational
beliefs) at half-time reported significantly lower threat compared
to athletes who received an irrational team talk (promoting
irrational beliefs). Research has also examined the effect of
irrational and rational beliefs on performance within golf (Turner
et al., 2018a,b). One study (Turner et al., 2018b) found that when
golfers used rational self-talk they performed more accurately in
a putting task than when they used irrational self-talk. Similarly,
Turner et al. (2018a) used an REBT intervention with amateur
golfers and found that as irrational beliefs decreased so to did
golf-specific anxiety and in addition, golf performance improved.
However, this fledgling research fails to examine how irrational
beliefs and challenge and threat interact to predict competitive
affective states. In the present study, cognitive appraisals,
irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat are assessed in relation
to upcoming competitive situations. Based on past research, it is
the combination of these psychological constructs that gives rise
to emotions in competitive situations (Neil et al., 2011).
The constructs of challenge and threat have been the subject
of growing research in sport literature (e.g., Blascovich et al.,
2004), spawning theories of challenge and threat that attempt
to predict athletic performance (Jones et al., 2009; Vine et al.,
2016). Challenge and threat are important constructs in Lazarus’s
appraisal process and are labeled as relational meanings in
his appraisal theory (Lazarus, 2000). Threat appraisal refers to
evaluation of future harm or loss; whereas challenge appraisal
occurs when an individual perceives a future gain (Lazarus,
1991). In extant theory, challenge and threat result in emotional
responses, where challenge is said to be associated with more
positive emotions, whereas threat is associated with more
negative emotions (Skinner and Brewer, 2004; Jones et al.,
2009). Furthermore, positive emotions are proposed to be
interpreted as facilitative for performance in challenge whereas
negative emotions as debilitative in threat (Skinner and Brewer,
2004; Jones et al., 2009). With regards to anxiety, research
evidence demonstrates that threat is positively associated with
greater cognitive and somatic anxiety and a more debilitative
interpretation of anxiety compared to challenge (Williams et al.,
2010; Quested et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2012). Therefore,
challenge and threat are important antecedents to affective
states that should be studied alongside cognitive appraisals, and
irrational beliefs.
The current research is the first to investigate and understand
how affective states occur through the complex interaction of
antecedent cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs and challenge
and threat within a specific sporting population. This integrative
examination might facilitate a more complete understanding of
how affective states occur through the complex interaction of
cognitive antecedents.
The Current Research
The main aim of the current study is to examine the interaction
between, cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge
and threat, to predict pre-competitive affective states. To achieve
this main aim, two study phases are reported; phase 1 meets
the main aim in an imagined imminent golf competition,
and phase 2 meets the main aim in an actual future golf
competition. For the two phases, we illustrate our hypotheses in
Figure 1, which are informed and supported by past research.
Based on past research, it is hypothesized that (H1) golfers’
cognitive appraisals will be negatively associated with irrational
beliefs (David et al., 2002, 2005), (H2) high irrational beliefs
will be positively associated with threat and negatively with
challenge (Dixon et al., 2016), (H3) cognitive appraisals will be
negatively associated with threat and positively with challenge
(Lazarus, 1999), (H4) challenge will be positively associated
with positive emotions, and threat will be positively associated
with negative emotions (Jones et al., 2009), (H5) threat will
be positively associated with cognitive and somatic anxiety,
and challenge will be negatively associated with cognitive and
somatic anxiety (Moore et al., 2012), and (H6) threat will be
negatively associated with facilitative perceptions of anxiety, and
challenge will be positively associated with facilitative perceptions
of anxiety (Quested et al., 2011). It is also hypothesized that
(H7) the relationship between cognitive appraisals and affective
states will be mediated by irrational beliefs (David et al., 2002,
2005) and challenge and threat (Jones et al., 2009). Further,
on the basis of meta-analytical data (Visla et al., 2016) where
stronger associations were found between irrational beliefs and
affective states during a real-stressor, we hypothesize that (H8)
the associations between target variables will be stronger in
phase 2 than in phase 1. Lastly, we examine differences in
variables between study phases 1 and 2, and hypothesize that
(H9) in phase 2 golfers will report greater cognitive appraisals,
irrational beliefs, threat and affective states and lower challenge,
positive emotions and facilitative perceptions of anxiety in
comparison to phase 1.
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FIGURE 1 | Proposed theoretical model.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In phase 1, 287 participants (Male = 232, Female = 55;
Mage = 38.7 ± 15.20) with a golf handicap between 0 and
31 (Mhandicap = 8.85 ± 7.13) took part in the study. The
participants encompassed Indians (n = 220), British (n = 41)
and other ethnic origins (n = 26). They had an average of
11.85 years (± 8.31) golfing experience and were competing at
a club (n = 115), amateur (n = 120) and professional (n = 52)
level. In phase 2, 212 golfers (Male = 169, Female = 43;
Mage = 38.55 ± 15.08) with a handicap between 0 and 31
(Mhandicap = 8.68± 7.16) completed the study. The participants
encompassed Indians (n = 161), British (n = 30) and other
ethnic origins (n = 21). They had an average of 12.28 years
(± 8.38) of golfing experience and were competing at the club
(n = 83), amateur (n = 86) and professional (n = 43) level. No
incentive was offered to the participants for taking part in the
research. Ethical approval was granted from the ethics committee
of Staffordshire University and individual informed consent was
obtained prior to data collection. The participants were recruited
by contacting local golf clubs on their willingness to participate
in the research project. The lead author approached golf clubs
and golf organizations in India to recruit golfers. Further, the
distribution of an online survey resulted in snowball sampling
that helped in the recruitment of golfers.
Measures
Irrational Performance Beliefs
The irrational Performance Beliefs Inventory (iPBI; Turner
et al., 2018) was used as a performance specific measure of
irrational beliefs. It comprises 28-items representing four core
irrational beliefs; primary belief and three secondary beliefs (Ellis
and Dryden, 1997). The primary irrational belief is stated to
be demandingness (DEM), which refers to rigid, absolutistic
requirements expressed in the form of “musts,” “shoulds,” and
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“oughts” (e.g., “I must attain my goals”). The three secondary
irrational beliefs comprise of awfulizing (AWF), low frustration
tolerance (LFT) and depreciation (DEP). AWF refers to the
beliefs that an individual holds where unpleasant situations are
assessed in the greatest negative manner (e.g., “If I don’t attain
my goals it is awful”). LFT reflects an individuals evaluation
that they are absolutely incapable of enduring a given situation,
accompanied with the view that they will not experience any
happiness if what they want does not exist (e.g., “If I don’t attain
my goals I can’t stand it”), and DEP appears when individuals
tend to be excessively critical about themselves, others or the
world when they fail to live up to their self-imposed demands
(e.g., “If I don’t attain my goals, I am a complete failure”; Ellis,
1994). The responses are made on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) to a series of
performance belief statements. The iPBI has previously been used
with athletes (Turner et al., 2019b) including golfers (Turner
et al., 2018a) and has demonstrated good internal validity and
reliability among sporting populations (Turner and Allen, 2018).
However, due to a novel and relatively homogenous sample
population in the current study, confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) was conducted to test the four-factor structure of the
iPBI. One item from DEM showing factor loading less than
0.40 was eliminated from further analyses (Comrey and Lee,
1992; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Cronbach’s alphas from the
current sample were 0.76 for DEM, 0.84 for AWF, 0.87 for LFT,
and 0.87 for DEP.
Cognitive Appraisals
The primary and secondary cognitive appraisals were assessed
with five single-item questions used in previous research (David
et al., 2002), modified from Smith and Lazarus (1993). The
single-item questions were answered on a 11-points Likert-
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). The
measure assesses motivational relevance (MR), motivational
congruence (MC; 2-items), problem-focused coping potential
(PFC), and emotion-focused coping (EFC). A total cognitive
appraisal score was obtained by calculating the mean score
of all the items. Higher cognitive appraisals indicated more
positive appraisals.
Challenge and Threat
The Challenge and Threat in Sport scale (CAT-Sport; Rossato
et al., 2016), comprises 12-items representing two subscales;
challenge and threat. The responses are made on a 6-point
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally
agree) in anticipation of a competition. The CAT-Sport has
only recently been developed, so confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) was conducted to test the two-factor structure. One
item from challenge displaying factor loading less than 0.40
was eliminated from further analyses (Comrey and Lee, 1992;
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The CAT-Sport has previously
demonstrated good internal validity and reliability in athlete
populations (Rossato et al., 2016) and the Cronbach’s alphas
from the current sample were 0.90 for threat, and 0.77
for challenge in phase 1, and 0.91 for threat and 0.82 for
challenge in phase 2.
Emotion
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson
et al., 1988) incorporates two 10-item subscales based on a bi-
dimensional theory of emotion. Individuals can experience a
mixture of positive affect (PA; e.g., “enthusiastic”) and negative
affect (NA; e.g., “afraid”) during a specific period of time (Watson
and Tellegen, 1985; Watson and Clark, 1997). The items are
scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very slightly
or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The PANAS has previously
demonstrated good internal validity and reliability in athlete
populations (Watson et al., 1988) and the Cronbach’s alphas from
the current sample were 0.87 for PA and 0.84 for NA in phase 1,
and 0.90 for PA and 0.91 for NA in phase 2.
Anxiety
The Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens
et al., 1990; Jones and Swain, 1992) was used to assess
the intensity and directional interpretation of cognitive and
somatic anxiety symptoms. Cognitive anxiety (CA) assesses the
mental component of anxiety caused by negative expectations
about success or negative self-evaluation (e.g., “I am concerned
about losing”) and somatic anxiety (SA) is associated with
the physiological or affective component of anxiety (e.g., “My
hands are clammy”). The items are scored on a 4-point Likert-
scale ranging between 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so) for
intensity. Further, the directional interpretation of the anxiety
symptoms was assessed using a single-item question on a 7-
point Likert-scale ranging from −3 (very negative/debilitative)
to + 3 (very positive/facilitative). The CSAI-2 has previously
demonstrated good internal validity and reliability in athlete
populations (Burton, 1998) and the Cronbach’s alphas from the
current sample were 0.88 for CA and 0.89 for SA in phase 1, and
0.88 for CA and 0.89 for SA in phase 2.
Design
The current study is a cross-sectional, single time-point
atemporal design that examines golfers’ approach to competitive
situations; an imagined imminent golf competition (phase 1),
and an actual future golf competition (phase 2). Specifically, we
examine how irrational beliefs interact with cognitive appraisals
and challenge and threat to predict affective states (emotions and
anxiety) across the two phases. The study was introduced in the
form of an online survey to explore the ways in which golfers
approach motivated performance situations (golf competition).
In phase 1, we adopted an experimental vignette methodology
(EVM, Aguinis and Bradley, 2014), where participants were
presented with a vignette that represented a real-life scenario
in which golfers imagined themselves approaching an imminent
golf competition, followed by questionnaires exploring their
thoughts and affective states about this event. The vignette
was adapted from Skinner and Brewer (2002) to represent a
stressful golfing situation, and was presented to players in written
form. The personal meaning of the scenario was enhanced by
emphasizing the prestige of the tournament, and the composition
of the audience. In addition, expectations of other personnel,
the final reward, and the presence of other competitors from
all across the country emphasized the importance of the event
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and ensured high levels of pressure. Further, ego-threatening
instructions were included, as in line with past golf research
(Wilson et al., 2009; Turner et al., 2018) where poor performance
represented lack of skill to play at a competitive level. Participants
took on average 26 min to complete the survey. The scenario
presented to the golfers was as follows:
You are at an important competition waiting for your name to be
announced by the starter at which point you will collect your score
card. As you approach the first tee box to start your round, you
notice there is a large and dense crowd, more than you have seen
before, waiting for you to tee off. This competition is crucial because
it is the most prestigious event you have played in and the prize
money is the most you’ve competed for. There are high expectations
for your performance from friends, family, and the crowd. If you
don’t play well then people will think you are not capable of playing
at this level and therefore you probably won’t be invited next year.
In addition, there is a really strong field of competitors from all
over the country. As you step up to the tee, you notice the drastic
change in weather conditions. . .. the wind has picked up and it is
now raining. You take your position and ready yourself to tee off . . .
In phase 2, participants were asked to provide details about
their next actual important golf competition and complete
questionnaires about their thoughts and affective states in
relation to that important event. The aim of phase 2 is to extend
phase 1 by examining how golfers’ irrational beliefs interact with
cognitive appraisals and challenge and threat to predict affective
states in relation to an actual future golf competition. Therefore,
the real-life event of an actual upcoming competition allows us to
explore the phenomenon in relation to a real-life stressor. This is
important, because irrational beliefs are implicated in affectivity
different for real vs. imagined stressors (Visla et al., 2016).
Analytic Strategy
Data for both the phases were examined for missing values. In
phase 1, little’s MCAR test revealed that across each variables data
between 2.4 and 10.5% were missing at random, χ2 = 462.55,
df = 425, p > 0.05. In phase 2, little’s MCAR test revealed that
across each variables the data between 2.8 and 4.7% were missing
at random, χ2 = 192.37, df = 169, p > 0.05. In the current
research, since the missing values were scattered throughout the
data, the employment of the deletion technique where missing
values are discarded would have resulted in substantial loss of
participants, thus reducing the total sample size and further
resulting in loss of power (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Baraldi
and Enders, 2010). Therefore, we used expectation maximisation
(EM) method, a simple and reasonable approach to estimate the
missing values (Graham, 2009), and providing a complete data set
for the main analyses (Quinton et al., 2018). Further, in line with
previous research (e.g., Dixon and Yuen, 1974; Orr et al., 1991;
Smith, 2011) the data were checked for outliers and data points
with z scores greater than 2 were winsorized which involved
replacing extreme values to reduce the influence of outliers on
the data. For phase 1, items for DEM (n = 15), AWF (n = 14),
LFT (n = 8), DEP (n = 13), MR (n = 13), MC (n = 14), PFC
(n = 12), EFC (n = 14), challenge (n = 14), threat (n = 7), positive
emotions (n = 11), negative emotions (n = 11), cognitive anxiety
(n = 9), somatic anxiety (n = 10), and directional interpretation
(n = 11) were windsorized. For phase 2, items for MR (n = 10),
MC (n = 8), PFC (n = 8), EFC (n = 13), challenge (n = 6),
threat (n = 10), positive emotions (n = 8), negative emotions
(n = 15), cognitive anxiety (n = 10), somatic anxiety (n = 10), and
directional interpretation (n = 15) were windsorized.
Prior to the main analyses, since the data was collected from
the same participants in regards to the imagined imminent golf
competition (phase 1), and an actual future golf competition
(phase 2), it was important to examine differences in cognitive
appraisals, challenge and threat, affective states (emotions and
anxiety) and directional interpretations of anxiety, between the
two phases. To compare the means for each dependent variable
between the imagined imminent golf competition and the actual
future golf competition, three repeated measures multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) were conducted, one
for cognitive appraisals, one for challenge and threat, and
one for affective states. In addition, one repeated measure
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted for directional
interpretations of anxiety. Age and handicap were included as
covariates in all analyses in both phases, and in phase 2, the
number of weeks until the next important competition was also
included as a covariate. The result of Shapiro-Wilk for number of
weeks, W(212) = 0.67, p = 0.000, indicated that this variable was
not normally distributed. Therefore, the variable was transformed
using log transformation to overcome the heteroscedastic errors
(i.e., large error variance) associated with the variable and to make
it more homogenous (Nevill, 1997).
Main analyses for both phases were conducted in three main
stages. First, descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations were
calculated for all self-report variables to examine associations
between cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, challenge and
threat, and affective states. Second, path analysis was employed
in conjunction with bootstrapping procedures to test the
hypothesized model using AMOS. Since most of the variables
were moderately to strongly correlated, it was possible to
introduce a structure to the correlation matrix in accordance with
the path diagram (see Figure 1). The model fit was evaluated
using the chi-square statistic (χ2), comparative fit index (CFI),
the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA). CFI
provides an indication of how the theoretical model better fits the
data in comparison to a base model constraining all constructs
to be uncorrelated with one another. A non-significant χ2 and
CFI value of 0.90 or above is considered a good fit (Bentler, 1990;
Hu and Bentler, 1998; Vandenbergh and Lance, 2000). Further, a
RMSEA value of<0.06 indicates a close fit whereas a value< 0.08
is also considered an acceptable fit (Browne and Cudek, 1993).
Vandenbergh and Lance (2000) suggest that a cut-off value of 0.10
for RMSEA is acceptable.
Lastly, serial atemporal multiple mediation analysis (SAMM)
were conducted using PROCESS version 2.10 for IBM SPSS
(Hayes, 2013), to understand the direct and indirect effects of
cognitive appraisal, irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat,
on affective states. Considering practical implications, PROCESS
was employed for multiple mediation as it calculates relevant
statistics automatically and efficiently in comparison to structural
equation modeling (SEM) programmes such as AMOS that
require greater effort and programming skills to gain relevant
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output. In addition, literature suggests (Hayes et al., 2017) that
where the models are entirely based on observed variables, the
results yielded from PROCESS and AMOS programmes are
substantively identical. Thus, the current methodology is in line
with Monteiro et al. (2018), where SEM was used to analyze
the relationship between different variables and serial multiple
mediation was used to access direct and indirect mediation
effects of independent variables on dependent variables. Figure 2
represents a generic model of SAMM with two mediators for
illustrative purposes. In the current study in both phases, the
independent variable (X) was cognitive appraisals and dependent
variables (Y) were affective states (positive or negative emotions,
cognitive and somatic anxiety, and directional interpretation
of anxiety). Since, there is an established causation from
cognitive appraisals to affective states (Lazarus, 1991), in the
current research, we treated affective states as the Y variable
and cognitive antecedents of affective states as the X and M
variables. The data is available on request from the first author
of the current study.
RESULTS
Repeated Measures Comparison of
Phase 1 and Phase 2
Cognitive Appraisals
The results of the MANCOVA indicated a significant main effect
for cognitive appraisals, Wilks’ 3 = 0.92, F(1, 199) = 4.28,
p < 0.01 η2 = 0.08. A significant within-subjects effect was
revealed for MC, F(1, 199) = 6.02, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.03, with
pairwise comparisons indicating that golfers perceive goals to
be less motivationally congruent in anticipation of the imagined
imminent golf competition (M = 6.94 ± 1.71) compared
to an actual future golf competition (M = 7.32 ± 1.89).
Similarly, a significant within-subjects effect was revealed for
PFC, F(1, 199) = 9.31, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.04, with pairwise
comparisons indicating that golfers perceived more problem
focused coping potential in anticipation of the imagined
imminent golf competition (M = 7.81 ± 1.85) compared to an
actual future golf competition (M = 7.59± 2.17).
Challenge and Threat
The results of the MANCOVA indicated a significant main effect
for challenge and threat, Wilks’ 3 = 0.92, F(1, 203) = 8.16,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.07. A significant within-subjects effect was
revealed for threat, F(1, 203) = 15.68, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.07,
with pairwise comparisons indicating golfers reported greater
threat in anticipation of the imagined imminent golf competition
(M = 2.79± 1.10) compared to an actual future golf competition
(M = 2.22± 1.02).
Affect
The results of the MANCOVA indicated a significant main effect
for emotions, Wilks’ 3 = 0.84, F(1, 199) = 8.98, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.15. A significant within-subjects effect was revealed for
negative emotion, F(1, 199) = 12.09, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.06,
with pairwise comparisons indicating golfers experienced more
negative emotions in anticipation of the imagined imminent
golf competition (M = 1.87 ± 0.55) compared to an actual
future golf competition (M = 1.53 ± 0.56). A significant within-
subjects effect was revealed for cognitive anxiety, F(1, 199) = 8.53,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.04, with pairwise comparisons indicating golfers
reported greater cognitive anxiety in anticipation of the imagined
imminent golf competition (M = 2.05 ± 0.64) compared to
an actual future golf competition (M = 1.79 ± 0.58). Also,
a significant within-subjects effect was revealed for somatic
anxiety, F(1, 199) = 34.63, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15, with pairwise
comparisons indicating golfers experienced more somatic anxiety
in anticipation of the imagined imminent golf competition
FIGURE 2 | Serial atemporal multiple mediation model with two mediators. X = independent variable; Y = dependent variable; M1, M2 = mediators. a1, a2, b1, b2,
d21, c’ = regression coefficients.
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(M = 2.04 ± 0.57) in comparison to an actual future golf
competition (M = 1.60± 0.50).
Directional Interpretation of Anxiety
The results of the ANCOVA indicated a significant main effect
for directional interpretation of anxiety, Wilks’ 3 = 0.91, F(1,
199) = 18.51, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.08, with pairwise comparisons
indicating that golfers perceived their anxiety as less facilitative
in anticipation of the imagined imminent golf competition
(M = 1.72± 1.26) compared to an actual future golf competition
(M = 2.01± 1.01).
PHASE 1 RESULTS
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations
for all variables.
Test of the Model
Path analysis revealed that the hypothesized model demonstrated
an acceptable fit to the data χ2(21) = 60.39, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.97,
RMSEA = 0.08. The standardized path coefficients for each
individual path are displayed in Figure 3, demonstrating patterns
consistent with study hypotheses. Overall, cognitive appraisals
and irrational beliefs accounted for 33% of total variance in threat
and 23% of total variance in challenge. With regards to affective
states (emotions and anxiety), cognitive appraisals, irrational
beliefs, and challenge and threat accounted for 35% of variance
in positive emotion, 47% of variance in negative emotion, 52% of
variance in cognitive anxiety, 37% of variance in somatic anxiety,
and 35% of variance in directional interpretation of anxiety.
Serial Atemporal Multiple Mediation
Analyses (SAMM)
A total of ten SAMM were conducted to assess the direct and
indirect effects of cognitive appraisals on affective states (positive
and negative emotions, and cognitive and somatic anxiety, and
directional interpretation of anxiety), through irrational beliefs,
and challenge and threat. Age and handicap were included as
covariates. The results of SAMM are presented in Tables 2–4.
Total effects for cognitive appraisals on affective states and
directional interpretation of anxiety were significant in all the
ten mediation models tested. Furthermore, SAMM generated the
following results:
Positive Emotion
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
positive emotion through challenge (β = 0.24, 95% CI = 0.16–
0.31) and through threat (β = 0.06, 95% CI = 0.02–0.11).
The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on positive emotion
through irrational beliefs (β = −0.03, 95% CI = −0.06 to −0.01)
was significant when threat was included in the model (i.e.,
model 6). Furthermore, there was a significant indirect effect for
cognitive appraisals on positive emotion through both irrational
beliefs and threat (β = 0.01, 95% CI = 0.003–0.03). In sum, there
was a significant positive direct effect for cognitive appraisals on
positive emotion when both mediators (i.e., irrational beliefs and
challenge or threat) were included.
Negative Emotion
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
negative emotion through challenge (β = −0.12, 95% CI = −0.19
to −0.06) and through threat (β = −0.18, 95% CI = −0.23 to
−0.12). The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on negative
emotion through irrational beliefs (β =−0.04, 95% CI =−0.08 to
−0.02) was significant when challenge was included in the model
(i.e., model 2). Furthermore, there was a significant indirect
effect for cognitive appraisals on negative emotion through both
irrational beliefs and threat (β = −0.04, 95% CI = −0.07 to
−0.01). In sum, there was a significant negative direct effect for
cognitive appraisals on negative emotion when both mediators
(i.e., irrational beliefs and challenge or threat) were included.
Cognitive Anxiety
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals
on cognitive anxiety through irrational beliefs when challenge
(β = −0.07, 95% CI = −0.11 to −0.02) or threat (β = −0.02,
95% CI = −0.05 to −0.01) were included in the model (i.e.,
model 3 and 8). The indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
cognitive anxiety were significant through challenge (β = −0.09,
95% CI = −0.16 to −0.04) and also through threat (β = −0.18,
95% CI = −0.25 to −0.13). Furthermore, there was a significant
indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on cognitive anxiety
through both irrational beliefs and threat (β = −0.04, 95%
CI = −0.07 to −0.01). In sum, there was a significant
negative direct effect for cognitive appraisals on cognitive anxiety
when both mediators (i.e., irrational beliefs and challenge or
threat) were included.
Somatic Anxiety
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
somatic anxiety through challenge (β = −0.11, 95% CI = −0.18
to −0.05) and through threat (β = −0.15, 95% CI = −0.21 to
−0.10). The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on somatic
anxiety through irrational beliefs (β = −0.04, 95% CI = −0.08 to
−0.01) was significant when challenge was included in the model
(i.e., model 4). Furthermore, there was a significant indirect
effect for cognitive appraisals on somatic anxiety through both
irrational beliefs and threat (β = −0.03, 95% CI = −0.06 to
−0.01). In sum, there was a significant negative direct effect for
cognitive appraisals on somatic anxiety when both mediators (i.e.,
irrational beliefs and challenge or threat) were included.
Directional Interpretation
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
directional interpretation of anxiety through challenge (β = 0.17,
95% CI = 0.11–0.24) and through threat (β = 0.10, 95%
CI = 0.06–0.15). The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on
directional interpretation of anxiety through irrational beliefs
(β = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.002–0.04) was significant when challenge
was included in the model (i.e., model 5). Furthermore, there
was a significant indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on
directional interpretation of anxiety through both irrational
beliefs and threat (β = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.01–04). In sum, there
was a significant positive direct effect for cognitive appraisals on
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TABLE 1 | Mean Scales, Standard Deviations and Correlations among all variables regarding imagined imminent golf competition.
N = 287 M SD Age Handi Exp DEM AWF LFT DEP iBs MR MC PFC EFC Cog App Chall Threat Post
Emo
Neg
Emo
CA SA DI
Age 38.71 15.20 – 0.65∗∗ 0.53∗∗ −0.04 −0.06 −0.18∗∗ −0.06 −0.11 −0.11 0.07 −0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.14∗ −0.06 −0.28∗∗ −0.12∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.16∗∗
Handi 8.85 7.13 – 0.10 0.04 0.04 −0.11 0.08 0.01 −0.00 −0.07 −0.08 −0.09 −0.10 −0.07 0.05 −0.09 −0.14∗ 0.06 −0.13∗ 0.10
Exp 11.86 8.31 – −0.02 −0.03 −0.08 −0.03 −0.05 −0.09 0.18∗∗ 0.07 −0.01 0.08 0.04 −0.06 01 −0.12∗ −0.08 −0.05 0.05
DEM 20.59 3.82 – 0.76∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.12 −0.19∗∗−0.04 −0.08 −0.10 0.01 0.35∗∗ 0.08 0.21∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.19∗∗−0.09
AWF 21.77 4.66 – 0.64∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.15∗ −0.21∗∗−0.13∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.06 0.46∗∗ 0.00 0.31∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.30∗∗−0.16∗∗
LFT 23.35 5.48 – 0.46∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.17∗∗−0.11 −0.10 −0.10 0.00 0.30∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.28∗∗−0.16∗∗
DEP 14.85 4.85 – 0.75∗∗ 0.04 −0.22∗∗−0.11 −0.30∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.47∗∗ −0.21∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.25∗∗−0.24∗∗
iBs 20.14 3.85 – 0.15∗ −0.24∗∗−0.12∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.08 0.48∗∗ 0.00 0.34∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.32∗∗−0.20∗∗
MR 8.59 1.91 – 0.09 0.15∗ 0.07 0.44∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.03 0.32∗∗ 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.15∗
MC 13.78 3.18 – 0.34∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.32∗∗ −0.33∗∗ 0.22∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.35∗∗−0.29∗∗ 0.32∗∗
PFC 7.86 1.86 – 0.41∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.40∗∗ −0.33∗∗ 0.38∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.36∗∗−0.30∗∗ 0.40∗∗
EFC 8.53 2.10 – 0.67∗∗ 0.38∗∗ −0.38∗∗ 0.28∗∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.34∗∗−0.37∗∗ 0.33∗∗
Cog App 9.69 1.49 – 0.48∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.44∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.38∗∗−0.35∗∗ 0.46∗∗
Chall 4.93 0.70 – −0.38∗∗ 0.59∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.33∗∗−0.34∗∗ 0.49∗∗
Threat 2.78 1.09 – −0.27∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.57∗∗−0.45∗∗
PostEmo 3.97 0.55 – −0.24∗∗ −0.22∗∗−0.22∗∗ 0.48∗∗
NegEmo 1.86 0.54 – 0.65∗∗ 0.71∗∗−0.48∗∗
CA 2.05 0.62 – 0.71∗∗−0.51∗∗
SA 2.02 0.55 – −0.48∗∗
DI 1.66 1.24 –
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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FIGURE 3 | Path analysis testing the theoretical model for imagined imminent golf competition. The model The model indicates all significant paths.
directional interpretation of anxiety when both mediators (i.e.,
irrational beliefs and challenge or threat) were included.
In summary, the data shows that the relationship between
cognitive appraisals and affective states is mediated by irrational
beliefs and threat in all models, and by irrational beliefs
and challenge in some models. In other words, the cognitive
appraisals, irrational beliefs and threat are seen as essential
antecedents in predicting affective states among golfers.
PHASE 2 RESULTS
Table 5 displays descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations
for all variables.
Test of the Model
Path analysis revealed that the hypothesized model demonstrated
an acceptable fit to the data χ2(31) = 107.31, p< 0.05, CFI = 0.94,
RMSEA = 0.11. The standardized path coefficients for each
individual path are displayed in Figure 4, demonstrating patterns
consistent with study hypotheses. Overall, cognitive appraisals
and irrational beliefs accounted for 37% of total variance in threat
and 57% of total variance in challenge. With regards to affective
states (emotions and anxiety), cognitive appraisals, irrational
beliefs, and challenge and threat accounted for 46% of variance
in positive emotion, 41% of variance in negative emotion, 53% in
cognitive anxiety, 40% in somatic anxiety, and 34% in directional
interpretation of anxiety.
Serial Atemporal Multiple Mediation
Analysis (SAMM)
A total of ten SAMM analyses were conducted to assess
the indirect effects of cognitive appraisals on affective states
(positive and negative emotions, cognitive and somatic anxiety,
and directional interpretation or anxiety), through irrational
beliefs and challenge and threat. Age, handicap and number
of weeks to the next important competition were included as
covariates. The results of SAMM are presented in Tables 6–8.
Total effects of cognitive appraisals on affective states and
directional interpretation of anxiety were significant in all the
ten mediation models tested. Furthermore, SAMM generated the
following results:
Positive Emotion
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
positive emotion through challenge (β = 0.36, 95% CI = 0.27–
0.45) and through threat (β = 0.08, 95% CI = 0.03–0.15).
The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on positive emotion
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TABLE 2 | Serial atemporal multiple mediation analysis for imagined imminent golf competition.
Model No. (M1) iBs (M2) appraisals (Y) outcome YR2 = F(,) = , P Total c = t(df) = , P Direct c’ = t (df) = , P Indirect# = effect, [to]
1 Challenge PostEmo R2 = 0.38 F (5,
281) = 35.24,
P < 0.001
0.16 t(283) = 8.12,
P = 0.00
0.08 t(283) = 3.94,
P = 0.00
Tot = 0.22 [0.15 to 0.30] Ind1 = −0.01 [−0.03 to 0.002]; Ind2 = 0.24 [0.16 to
0.32]; Ind 3 = −0.001 [−0.01 to 0.008]
2 NegEmo R2 = 0.32 F (5,
281) = 26.46,
P < 0.001
−0.13 t(283) = −6.85,
P = 0.00
−0.07 t(283) = −3.48,
P = 0.00
Tot = −0.17 [−0.24 to
−0.10]
Ind1 = −0.04 [−0.08 to −0.02]; Ind2 = −0.12
[−0.19 to −0.06]; Ind3 = 0.0003 [−0.005 to 0.01]
3 CogAnxiety R2 = 0.35 F (5,
281) = 29.77,
P < 0.001
−0.15 t(283) = −6.67,
P = 0.00
−0.08 t(283) = −3.60,
P = 0.00
Tot = −0.16 [−0.24 to
−0.08]
Ind1 = −0.07 [−0.11 to −0.02]; Ind2 = −0.09
[−0.16 to −0.03]; Ind3 = 0.0003 [−0.003 to 0.005]
4 SomAnxiety R2 = 0.26 F (5,
281) = 20.17,
P < 0.001
−0.13 t(283) = −6.38,
P = 0.00
−0.07 t(283) = −3.29,
P = 0.00
Tot = −0.15 [−0.24 to
−0.08]
Ind1 = −0.04 [−0.08 to −0.01]; Ind2 = −0.11
[−0.18 to −0.05]; Ind3 = 0.0003 [−0.004 to 0.01]
5 DI R2 = 0.35 F (5,
281) = 30.11,
P < 0.001
0.38 t(283) = 8.87,
P = 0.00
0.22 t(283) = 4.83,
P = 0.00
Tot = 0.19 [0.12 to 0.27] Ind1 = 0.02 [0.002 to 0.04]; Ind2 = 0.17 [0.11 to
0.24]; Ind3 = −0.0005 [−0.01 to 0.01]
6 Threat PostEmo R2 = 0.23 F (5,
281) = 16.81,
P < 0.001
0.16 t(283) = 8.12,
P = 0.00
0.14 t(283) = 6.72,
P = 0.00
Tot = 0.05 [0.004 to 0.10] Ind1 = −0.03 [−0.06 to −0.01]; Ind2 = 0.06 [0.02
to 0.11]; Ind3 = 0.01 [0.003 to 0.03]
7 NegEmo R2 = 0.48 F (5,
281) = 52.02,
P < 0.001
−0.13 t(283) = −6.85,
P = 0.00
−0.05 t(283) = −3.03,
P = 0.00
Tot = −0.22 [−0.29 to
−0.16]
Ind1 = −0.004 [−0.02 to 0.01]; Ind2 = −0.18
[−0.24 to −0.12]; Ind3 = −0.04 [−0.07 to −0.01]
8 CogAnxiety R 2 = 0.55 F (5,
281) = 67.86,
P < 0.001
−0.15 t(283) = −6.67,
P = 0.00
−0.046 t(283) = −2.48,
P = 0.01
Tot = −0.25 [−0.33 to
−0.18]
Ind1 = −0.02 [−0.05 to −0.01]; Ind2 = −0.18
[−0.25 to −0.13]; Ind3 = −0.04 [−0.07 to −0.02]
9 Som Anxiety R2 = 0.38 F (5,
281) = 34.01,
P < 0.001
−0.13 t(283) = −6.38,
P = 0.00
−0.06 t(283) = −2.99,
P = 0.00
Tot = −0.19 [−0.26 to
−0.13]
Ind1 = −0.01 [−0.03 to 0.01]; Ind2 = −0.15 [−0.21
to −0.10]; Ind3 = −0.03 [−0.06 to −0.01]
10 DI R2 = 0.32 F (5,
281) = 26.47,
P < 0.001
0.38 t(283) = 8.87,
P = 0.00
0.28 t(283) = 6.34,
P = 0.00
Tot = 0.12 [0.08 to 0.17] Ind1 = −0.003 [−0.03 to 0.02]; Ind2 = 0.10 [0.06 to
0.15]; Ind3 = 0.02 [0.01 to 0.04]
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TABLE 3 | Regression weights for serial atemporal multiple mediation models for
imagined imminent golf competition.
Mediators Regression weights
Model (M1) (M2) (Y) a1 b1 d21 b2 a2
No. iBs outcome
1 Challenge PostEmo −0.46∗∗ 0.01 0.00 0.39∗∗ 0.22∗∗
2 NegEmo −0.46∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00 −0.19∗∗ 0.22∗∗
3 CogAnxiety −0.46∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.00 −0.17∗∗ 0.22∗∗
4 SomAnxiety −0.46∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00 −0.18∗∗ 0.22∗∗
5 DI −0.46∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.00 0.64∗∗ 0.22∗∗
6 Threat PostEmo −0.46 0.02∗∗ 0.11∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.23∗∗
7 NegEmo −0.46∗∗ 0.00 0.11∗∗ 0.28∗∗ −0.23∗∗
8 CogAnxiety −0.46∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.34∗∗ −0.23∗∗
9 Som Anxiety −0.46∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗ 0.24∗∗ −0.23∗∗
10 DI −0.46∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.23∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
through irrational beliefs (β = −0.05, 95% CI = −0.10 to −0.01)
was significant when threat was included in the model (i.e.,
model 6). Furthermore, there was a significant indirect effect for
cognitive appraisals on positive emotion through both irrational
beliefs and challenge (β = −0.02, 95% CI = −0.04 to −0.002)
or threat (β = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.003–0.04). In sum, there was
a significant positive direct effect for cognitive appraisals on
positive emotion when both mediators (i.e., irrational beliefs and
challenge or threat) were included.
Negative Emotion
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
negative emotion through challenge (β = −0.21, 95% CI = −0.31
to −0.11) and through threat (β = −0.19, 95% CI = −0.27 to
−0.11). The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on negative
emotion through irrational beliefs (β =−0.05, 95% CI =−0.09 to
−0.01) was significant when challenge was included in the model
(i.e., model 2). Furthermore, there was a significant indirect
effect for cognitive appraisals on negative emotion through both
irrational beliefs and challenge (β = 0.01, 95% CI = 0.001–0.03) or
threat (β = −0.04, 95% CI = −0.07 to −0.01). In sum, there was
a non-significant negative direct effect for cognitive appraisals on
negative emotion when both mediators (i.e., irrational beliefs and
challenge) were included.
Cognitive Anxiety
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals
on cognitive anxiety through irrational beliefs when challenge
(β = −0.08, 95% CI = −0.15 to −0.03) or threat (β = −0.03,
95% CI = −0.07 to −0.01) were included in the model (i.e.,
model 3 and 8). The indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
cognitive anxiety were significant through challenge (β = −0.12,
95% CI = −0.21 to −0.03) and also through threat (β = −0.22,
95% CI = −0.30 to −0.13). Furthermore, there was a significant
indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on cognitive anxiety
through both irrational beliefs and challenge (β = 0.01, 95%
CI = 0.0003–0.02) or threat (β = −0.05, 95% CI = −0.08 to
−0.02). In sum, there was a non-significant negative direct effect
TABLE 4 | Causal chain according to models (X-M-M-Y) for imagined imminent
golf competition.
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Post Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Post Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Post Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Neg Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Neg Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Neg Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Cog anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Cog anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Cog anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Som anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Som anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Som anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs DI
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge DI
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge DI
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Post Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Post Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Post Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Neg Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Neg Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Neg Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Cog anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Cog anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Cog anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Som anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Som anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Som anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs DI
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat DI
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat DI
Values in bold indicate significant SAMM paths.
for cognitive appraisals on cognitive anxiety when both mediators
(i.e., irrational beliefs and challenge or threat) were included.
Somatic Anxiety
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
somatic anxiety through challenge (β = −0.20, 95% CI = −0.30
to −0.10) and through threat (β = 0.18, 95% CI = −0.26 to
−0.11). The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on somatic
anxiety through irrational beliefs (β = −0.05, 95% CI = −0.10 to
−0.01) was significant when challenge was included in the model
(i.e., model 4). Furthermore, there was a significant indirect
path for cognitive appraisals on somatic anxiety through both
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TABLE 5 | Mean Scales, Standard Deviations and Correlations among all variables for actual future golf competition.
N = 212 M SD Age Handi Exp No. of
weeks
DEM AWF LFT DEP Total
iBs
MR MC PFC EFC Cog
App
Chall Threat Post
Emo
Neg
Emo
CA SA DI
Age 38.55 15.08 – 0.62∗∗ 0.53∗∗ −0.07 −0.04 −0.07 −0.18∗∗ −0.07 −0.12 −0.18∗∗ −0.04 −0.25∗∗ −0.04 −0.16∗ −0.10 −0.20∗∗ −0.01 −0.27∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.19∗∗ 0.04
Handi 8.68 7.15 – 0.09 −0.10 0.07 0.10 −0.08 0.14∗ 0.06 −0.23∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.12 0.04 −0.08 −0.09 −0.02 −0.12 0.02
Exp 12.81 8.38 – −0.15∗ −0.05 −0.10 −0.13 −0.06 −0.10 −0.16∗ 0.01 −0.06 −0.04 −0.07 −0.07 −0.08 −0.08 −0.13 −0.10 −0.05 −0.03
No. of
weeks
1.16 1.07 – −0.06 0.00 −0.07 −0.01 −0.04 0.07 −0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 −0.05 0.14∗ 0.07 0.12 0.15∗ 0.15∗ −0.04
DEM 20.53 3.83 – 0.77∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.06 −0.14∗ −0.07 −0.15∗ −0.11 0.13 0.31∗∗ 0.11 0.10 0.31∗∗ 0.13 0.00
AWF 21.79 4.75 – 0.67∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 0.04 −0.25∗∗ −0.12 −0.16∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.00 0.43∗∗ 0.02 0.26∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.15∗
LFT 23.59 5.52 – 0.47∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.14∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.01 −0.11 −0.09 0.14∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.12 0.15∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.16∗ −0.09
DEP 14.90 5.11 – 0.77∗∗ 0.01 −0.36∗∗ −0.13 −0.34∗∗ −0.30∗∗ −0.15∗ 0.51∗∗ −0.15∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.37∗∗ −0.27∗∗
Total iBs 20.20 3.98 – 0.08 −0.30∗∗ −0.09 −0.23∗∗ −0.21∗∗ 0.03 0.46∗∗ 0.03 0.28∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.28∗∗ −0.16∗
MR 7.82 2.48 – 0.30∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.40∗∗ −0.13 0.43∗∗ 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.20∗∗
MC 14.78 3.63 – 0.32∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.42∗∗ −0.41∗∗ 0.30∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.44∗∗
PFC 7.60 2.19 – 0.53∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.44∗∗ −0.20∗∗ 0.34∗∗ −0.11 −0.14∗ −0.17∗ 0.33∗∗
EFC 8.44 2.21 – 0.74∗∗ 0.41∗∗ −0.35∗∗ 0.33∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.50∗∗
Cog App 9.66 1.90 – 0.58∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.48∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −0.30∗∗ −0.35∗∗ 0.51∗∗
Chall 4.96 0.73 – −0.39∗∗ 0.66∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.39∗∗ 0.54∗∗
Threat 2.24 1.00 – −0.30∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.61∗∗ −0.40∗∗
PostEm 3.98 0.65 – −0.27∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.25∗∗ 0.43∗∗
NegEm 1.53 0.53 – 0.72∗∗ 0.82∗∗ −0.40∗∗
CA 1.80 0.57 – 0.73∗∗ −0.40∗∗
SA 1.61 0.49 – −0.46∗∗
DI 1.99 1.00 –
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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FIGURE 4 | Path analysis testing the theoretical model for an actual future golf competition. The model indicates all significant paths.
irrational beliefs and challenge (β = 0.01, 95% CI = 0.001–0.02)
or threat (β = −0.04, 95% CI = −0.07 to −0.01). In sum, there
was a significant negative direct effect for cognitive appraisals on
somatic anxiety when both mediators (i.e., irrational beliefs and
challenge or threat) were included.
Directional Interpretation
There were significant indirect effects for cognitive appraisals on
directional interpretation of anxiety through challenge (β = 0.24,
95% CI = 0.14–0.34) and also through threat (β = 0.08, 95%
CI = 0.03–0.14). The indirect effect for cognitive appraisals on
directional interpretation of anxiety through irrational beliefs
(β = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.0005–0.06) was significant when challenge
was included in the model (i.e., model 5). Furthermore, there was
a significant indirect path for cognitive appraisals on directional
interpretation of anxiety through both irrational beliefs and
challenge (β = −0.01, 95% CI = −0.03 to −0.001) or threat
(β = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.003–0.04). In sum, there was a significant
positive direct effect for cognitive appraisals on directional
interpretation of anxiety when both mediators (i.e., irrational
beliefs and challenge or threat) were included.
In summary, data analyses demonstrate that the relationships
between cognitive appraisals and affective states and directional
interpretation of anxiety is mediated by irrational beliefs and
challenge and threat in all models. In other words, the interaction
of cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and
threat, emerged as antecedent to the golfers’ affective states
on approach to both imagined imminent, and actual future
golf competitions.
DISCUSSION
The main aim of the current study was to examine the interaction
between cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and
threat, in anteceding pre-competitive affective states (emotions
and anxiety) and directional interpretation of anxiety in golfers.
To achieve this main aim, two study phases were undertaken
where golfers considered an imagined imminent golf competition
(phase 1), and an actual future golf competition (phase 2).
The current study is the first to investigate how affective states
occur through the complex interaction of antecedent cognitive
appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat, within a
specific sporting population.
In accordance with study hypotheses, the results of path
analyses across both the study phases revealed that threat was
positively associated with negative emotions (H4) and both
cognitive and somatic anxiety (H5). Threat was also negatively
associated with directional interpretation of anxiety, such that
greater threat was associated with less facilitative perceptions
of anxiety (H6). In addition, threat was positively associated
with irrational beliefs (H2) and negatively associated with
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TABLE 6 | Serial atemporal multiple mediation analysis for actual future golf competition.
Model No. (M1) iBs (M2) appraisals (Y) outcome YR2 = F(,) = , P Total c = t(df) = , P Direct c’ = t (df) = , P Indirect# = effect, [to]
1 Challenge PostEmo R2 = 0.47 F (6,
205) = 30.44,
P < 0.001
0.17 t(207) = 7.89,
P = 0.00
0.06 t(207) = 2.52,
P = 0.01
Tot = 0.33 [0.24 to 0.43] Ind1 = −0.01 [−0.04 to 0.01] Ind2 = 0.36 [0.27 to
0.45] Ind3 = −0.02 [−0.04 to −0.002]
2 NegEmo R2 = 0.32 F (6,
205) = 15.81,
P < 0.001
−0.10 t(207) = −5.55,
P = 0.00
−0.03 t(207) = −1.45,
P = 0.15
Tot = −0.25 [−0.35 to
−0.14]
Ind1 = −0.05 [−0.09 to −0.01] Ind2 = −0.21
[−0.31 to −0.11] Ind3 = 0.01 [0.001 to 0.03]
3 Cog anxiety R2 = 0.32 F (6,
205) = 16.42,
P < 0.001
−0.10 t(207) = −4.98,
P = 0.00
−0.040 t(207) = −1.76,
P = 0.08
Tot = −0.20 [−0.31 to
−0.09]
Ind1 = −0.08 [−0.15 to −0.03] Ind2 = −0.12
[−0.21 to −0.03] Ind3 = 0.01 [0.0003 to 0.02]
4 Som anxiety R2 = 0.31 F (6,
205) = 15.63,
P < 0.001
−0.11 t(207) = −6.47,
P = 0.00
−0.04 t(207) = −2.33,
P = 0.02
Tot = −0.24 [−0.35 to
−0.14]
Ind1 = −0.05 [−0.10 to −0.01] Ind2 = −0.20
[−0.30 to −0.10] Ind3 = 0.01 [0.001 to 0.02]
5 DI R2 = 0.39 F (6,
205) = 22.11,
P < 0.001
0.30 t(207) = 9.34,
P = 0.00
0.17 t(207) = 4.44,
P = 0.00
Tot = 0.25 [0.15 to 0.35] Ind1 = 0.02 [0.0005 to 0.06] Ind2 = 0.24 [0.14 to
0.34] Ind3 = −0.01 [−0.03 to −0.001]
6 Threat PostEmo R2 = 0.30 F (6,
205) = 14.58,
P < 0.001
0.17 t(207) = 7.89,
P = 0.00
0.15 t(207) = 6.59,
P = 0.00
Tot = 0.05 [−0.01 to 0.13] Ind1 = −0.05 [−0.10 to −0.01] Ind2 = 0.08 [0.03 to
0.15] Ind3 = 0.02 [0.003 to 0.04]
7 NegEmo R2 = 0.43 F (6,
205) = 26.21,
P < 0.001
−0.10 t(207) = −5.55,
P = 0.00
−0.04 t(207) = −2.18,
P = 0.03
Tot = −0.22 [−0.31 to
−0.14]
Ind1 = 0.003 [−0.02 to 0.03] Ind2 = −0.19 [−0.27
to −0.11] Ind3 = −0.04 [−0.07 to −0.01]
8 Cog anxiety R2 = 0.55 F (6,
205) = 42.40,
P < 0.001
−0.10 t(207) = −4.98,
P = 0.00
−0.01 t(207) = −0.66,
P = 0.51
Tot = −0.29 [−0.39 to
−0.20]
Ind1 = −0.031 [−0.07 to −0.01] Ind2 = −0.22
[−0.30 to −0.13] Ind3 = −0.05 [−0.08 to −0.02]
9 Som anxiety R2 = 0.43 F (6,
205) = 25.64,
P < 0.001
−0.107 t(207) = −6.47,
P = 0.00
−0.049 t(207) = −3.18,
P = 0.00
Tot = −0.22 [−0.31 to
−0.15]
Ind1 = −0.002 [−0.03 to 0.02] Ind2 = −0.18
[−0.26 to −0.11] Ind3 = −0.04 [−0.07 to −0.01]
10 DI R2 = 0.34 F (6,
205) = 17.48,
P < 0.001
0.30 t(207) = 9.34,
P = 0.00
0.25 t(207) = 7.24,
P = 0.00
Total = 0.09 [0.04 to 0.16] Ind1 = −0.01 [−0.04 to 0.02] Ind2 = 0.08 [0.03 to
0.14] Ind3 = 0.02 [0.003 to 0.04]
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TABLE 7 | Regression weights for serial atemporal multiple mediation models for
actual future golf competition.
Mediators Regression weights
Model (M1) (M2) (Y) a1 b1 d21 b2 a2
No. iBs outcome
1 Challenge PostEmo −0.43∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.24∗∗
2 NegEmo −0.43∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗ −0.24∗∗ 0.24∗∗
3 Cog anxiety −0.43∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.03∗ −0.15∗ 0.24∗∗
4 Som anxiety −0.43∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.24∗∗
5 DI −0.43∗∗ −.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.24∗∗
6 Threat PostEmo −0.43∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.18∗∗
7 NegEmo −0.43∗∗ −0.00 0.09∗∗ 0.29∗∗ −0.18∗∗
8 Cog anxiety −0.43∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.36∗∗ −0.18∗∗
9 Som anxiety −0.43∗∗ 0.00 0.09∗∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.18∗∗
10 DI −0.43∗∗ 0.01 0.09∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.18∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
cognitive appraisals (H3). Challenge was negatively associated
with negative emotions (H4) and somatic anxiety (H5), and
positively associated with positive emotions (H4) and more
facilitative perceptions of anxiety (H6). Also, cognitive appraisals
were negatively associated with irrational beliefs (H1). Further,
challenge was positively related to cognitive appraisals (H3), and
in phase 2 was positively associated with irrational beliefs (H2),
but unrelated to irrational beliefs in phase 1.
In other words, a golfer approaching competition with low
cognitive appraisals, that report high irrational beliefs, is more
likely to be threatened, and less likely to be challenged. As a result,
the golfer will likely experience greater negative emotions and
anxiety and is more likely to perceive their anxiety symptoms as
less facilitative for their performance in that competition.
The findings of current research support some extant research
(e.g., David et al., 2002, 2005) in revealing the interaction between
irrational beliefs and cognitive appraisals in the prediction of
affective states. The current research extends previous research
by investigating and understanding the complex interaction of
antecedents to affective states within a golf specific sport setting.
David et al. (2002, 2005) did not consider challenge and threat
in their studies. Our findings that challenge and threat mediate
the relationship between cognitive appraisals and affective states
alongside irrational beliefs is an important extension of our
knowledge of how affective states occur. Also, our research
takes into account the interpretation of anxiety, previously
unexplored in research. The current research also makes
methodological advancements by using more sophisticated
analytical procedures (SEM and SAMM).
The inclusion of challenge and threat in the current
study, alongside irrational beliefs and cognitive appraisals, is a
particularly important extension of past research because it more
comprehensively reflects the antecedents of affective states in
anticipation of personally relevant situations. Researchers have
found irrational beliefs to be positively associated with threat
(Dixon et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2018), but the current study
develops this research by offering an integration of cognitive
TABLE 8 | Causal chain according to models (X-M-M-Y) for actual future
golf competition.
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Post Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Post Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Post Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Neg Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Neg Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Neg Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Cog anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Cog anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Cog anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Som anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge Som anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge Som anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs DI
Ind2 Cog appraisals Challenge DI
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Challenge DI
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Post Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Post Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Post Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Neg Emo
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Neg Emo
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Neg Emo
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Cog anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Cog anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Cog anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs Som anxiety
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat Som anxiety
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat Som anxiety
SAMM
Ind1 Cog appraisals iBs DI
Ind2 Cog appraisals Threat DI
Ind3 Cog appraisals iBs Threat DI
Values in bold indicate significant SAMM paths.
appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat. The
finding that challenge and threat are associated differentially with
affective states is in line with the postulations of prominent
theories (e.g., Skinner and Brewer, 2004; Jones et al., 2009). That
is, challenge was associated with positive affective states, and
more facilitative perceptions of anxiety, whilst threat was related
to negative affective states, and less facilitative perceptions of
anxiety. The findings concerning anxiety in the current study
are in line with previous research that demonstrates threat to
be associated with greater cognitive and somatic anxiety and a
more debilitative interpretation of anxiety responses compared
to a challenge (e.g., Williams et al., 2010; Quested et al., 2011;
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Moore et al., 2012). Specifically, Moore et al. (2012) found
that the golfers who received challenge instructions reported
lower levels of cognitive anxiety compared to golfers who
received threat instructions. In addition, golfers who received
challenge instructions interpreted anxiety to be more facilitative
for their performance in comparison to golfers who received
threat instructions.
Beyond the bivariate associations emerging from path
analyses, SAMM provided some important evidence concerning
the mechanisms that could explain the relationships between
cognitive appraisals and affective states. There were significant
indirect effects across both study phases, implying that the
association between cognitive appraisals and affective states was
mediated by irrational beliefs and threat (H7). This is in support
of previous research in which irrational beliefs are associated
with cognitive appraisals (David et al., 2002, 2005), and where
higher irrational beliefs are associated with greater threat, and
lesser challenge (Dixon et al., 2016). That irrational beliefs and
threat mediated the relationship between cognitive appraisal
and affective states in serial suggests that it is the interaction
between cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and threat, that
is particularly important for understanding anticipatory affective
states on approach to competitive golf situations.
With regards to challenge, there were some differences
between phase 1 and phase 2 in the serial multiple atemporal
mediation results. With challenge in the mediation model, at
phase 1 no significant serial mediation was found for any affective
outcomes, although simple mediation was revealed. However, in
phase 2, significant serial mediation was found for all affective
states, showing that irrational beliefs and challenge (H7) in
serial mediated the association between cognitive appraisals and
affective states. This lack of serial mediation in phase 1 could
be due to a variety of factors. First, there is no significant
relationship between irrational beliefs and challenge in phase
1, revealed in bivariate correlations (Table 1), and in the path
analysis. Second, in phase 1 participants approached an imagined
competition scenario, whereas in phase 2 they approached a real
future competition. It might be that the imagined event induced
greater psychological pressure than what the participants might
face in their next actual competition. In phase 1, we induced
pressure using ego-threat, but in phase 2, we did not induce
pressure at all. Therefore, challenge might have been more salient
in phase 2 where a participant’s next competition might be one
in which they are facing less pressure to perform because some
participants are unlikely to be performing under the pressured
conditions reflected in phase 1. Therefore, challenge is more
likely to emerge on approach to a less pressured competition
(Blascovich and Mendes, 2000).
The finding that mediation and bivariate associations differed
across phase 1 and phase 2 is also echoed in the phase 1-phase 2
tests of differences, and differences in the strength of relationships
between the two phases, reported in the results. Specifically, the
results revealed that golfers appraised the imagined imminent
competition as less motivationally congruent and perceived
greater problem focused coping potential during phase 1 than in
phase 2. Also, the golfers reported greater threat greater negative
emotions and anxiety in phase 1. PFC reflects the potential to
act directly on the situation with the purpose of changing the
situation or bringing it in accordance with one’s desires (Lazarus,
1999). However, in the current study, PFC is unrealistic for
the golfers because the imagined competition is imminent and
unchangeable. For instance, if a golfer perceives the situation to
be incongruent with his or her goals, focuses on problem focused
coping and evaluates the competition as a threat, then he or she is
more likely to experience greater negative emotions and anxiety
before an imminent golf competition.
The phase 1-phase 2 differences were unexpected and contrary
to our hypotheses (H8, 9). We expected golfers to experience
stronger negative emotions during phase 2 (H9), and we
expected stronger associations between variables in phase 2
(H8), because research indicates that real events are more
stressful and should elicit bivariate associations (Visla et al.,
2016). It is important however to consider past literature,
which suggests that temporal proximity is an important factor
when measuring responses to stressful events. For instance,
research has extensively investigated the temporal patterning of
competitive anxiety (Cerin et al., 2000) and the findings of the
studies revealed that the intensity of the somatic component of
competitive anxiety increases as competition nears (Slaughter
et al., 1994), whereas the cognitive anxiety component can
increase (Swain and Jones, 1992; Slaughter et al., 1994) or remain
stable (Caruso et al., 1990) on approach to competition. Our
findings that affective states were lower in the real event (phase
2) in comparison to the imminent imagined situation (phase 1)
could be because the next event for each participant varied in
proximity ranging from a few days to months.
The results of the present study indicate the importance
of using various procedural and data analytical methods
to investigate the associations between cognitive appraisals,
irrational beliefs, challenge and threat, and affective states.
Although, there were some differences between phases 1 and
phase 2, overall path analytical and atemporal mediational
models were broadly consistent across both the phases. The
findings of the current paper may have some important
theoretical implications, in part because we offer a more complex
model than has previously need proposed and tested (e.g., David
et al., 2002). It is essential and advantageous to consider cognitive
appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat, in the
occurrence of affective states. The model proposed and tested in
the current study provides a more accurate and comprehensive
explanation concerning the antecedents of affective states
on approach to competitive situations. Importantly, cognitive
appraisals and irrational beliefs are seen as co-occurring
simultaneously rather than occurring in a sequential and fixed
order (Ziegler, 2001).
The consistency in SEM and SAMM results between phases 1
and 2 demonstrate the utility of experimental vignettes that
represent real-life golf scenarios. The current research has
not investigated REBT interventions per se, however, it has
provided useful information for the readers with regards to
potential practical implications. That is, by having golfers imagine
approaching an upcoming competition, we were able to identify
their beliefs and trigger affective states similar to what was
reported for a real golf competition. Thus, practitioners in the
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field can encourage athletes to imagine upcoming situations in
order to trigger cognitive appraisals and irrational beliefs for the
purposes of more accurate assessment and intervention. Indeed,
in REBT Rational Emotive Imagery (REI) is an oft-used technique
(Maultsby, 1971) with athletes (Turner and Bennett, 2018). REI
involves athletes visualizing the situation that elicits unhealthy
negative emotions and then emotional change is brought about
by encouraging them to change their irrational beliefs into
rational beliefs.
Researchers have not yet investigated the effects of REI
within sporting performance, but motivational general arousal
(MG-A) imagery has been suggested as an effective intervention
for the enhancement of athletes overall affect experiences and
interpretation of pre-competitive symptoms (Mellalieu et al.,
2009). Clearly, there is some overlap between MG-A imagery
and REI, where imagery focuses upon the emotional experiences
associated with stress, anxiety and arousal (Vadocz et al., 1997).
However, in MG-A imagery the athletes are asked to imagine
arousal reducing images (e.g., imagine oneself in a relaxed
place) whereas, in REI the athletes are asked to alter their
irrational beliefs in order to change their unhealthy emotional
responses to the imagined situation. Further, imagery has been
used in research to manipulate challenge and threat (Hale and
Whitehouse, 1998; Williams et al., 2010; Williams and Cumming,
2012) and deemed as a useful strategy to help athletes evaluate the
competitive situation as a challenge prior to their performance.
Additionally, the findings of the current research have established
associations between cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and
challenge and threat (David et al., 2002; Dixon et al., 2016; Evans
et al., 2018). Therefore, practitioners can promote the use of REI
combined with MG-A imagery with athletes during consultation.
For instance, athletes can be asked to imagine themselves in
events or situations (A) that obstruct their goals (G), and
trigger unhealthy emotional and behavioral consequences (C),
depending on their beliefs about the self, others, and the world
in relation to the situation (A). If the athletes beliefs (B) are
irrational (rigid, illogical, and extreme) then the practitioner
can help them change their irrational beliefs into rational
beliefs (flexible, logical, and non-extreme), which in turn can
influence athletes to appraise the competition as a challenge, thus,
leading to healthy emotional and behavioral responses (C) prior
competition. Thus, similar to the imaged situations, REI can be
a useful practical tool for practitioners to use with athletes to
encourage healthy affective states among athletes in competitions
(Ellis and Dryden, 1997).
The current research is not without its limitations. The
primary limitation is that we adopted a cross-sectional single time
point atemporal design. Cognitions and affective states change in
the lead up to important events (e.g., Skinner and Brewer, 2002),
and cognitive appraisals are most accurately considered to be
iterative, rather than static and singular occurrences (Blascovich
and Mendes, 2000; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Schneider, 2008).
Therefore, future research should explore the role that irrational
beliefs play in the temporal changes in cognitive appraisals and
affective states in the lead up to a sport competition.
Furthermore, the current research uses self-report measures,
which can result in biases when investigating cognitive appraisals
(e.g., Paunonen and LeBel, 2012). It is possible that the
hypothetical scenario in the current paper influenced appraisals
unconsciously, outside of the conscious awareness of the
participants. Indeed, it may be that only some aspects of
cognitive appraisal are consciously accessible with an even
smaller section of those perceptions considered acceptable to
report by individuals (e.g., Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; LeDoux,
1998; Blascovich and Mendes, 2000; Quigley et al., 2002). To
overcome such a limitation, future research using longitudinal
designs could investigate emotional experience using more
objective psychophysiological markers (see Jones et al., 2009).
Also, future researchers would benefit from the development of
a sport specific measure for primary and secondary cognitive
appraisals. Further, the current research lacks objective measure
of sport performance, and researchers should aim to explore
how irrational beliefs and cognitive appraisals interact to predict
affective states, and in turn, athletic performance. The current
sample also involves higher proportion of male golfers in
comparison to females. The sex-imbalance with the sport of
golf, with 15% of golf club members being female (England
Golf, 2018) makes it difficult to make comparisons, therefore
future research should look at recruiting equal numbers of
males and females for a detailed comparisons (Turner et al.,
2018b). In addition, the substantial time delay from completion
of the questionnaires to the next competition for some golfers
meant that there is great variability in the time to event data.
Indeed, due to the variability, we transformed the variable
number of weeks to allow us to include it in the analyses
(make it more homogenous). Nevertheless, future research might
consider recruiting participants within the same time proximity
to the next competition to understand the phenomenon in a
more homogenous data set. Lastly, within current research, the
participants were not recruited based upon a specific range
of handicap. The current research aimed to recruit golfers
competing at all different levels being club, amateur golfers
and professional golfers. Hence, the participants differed across
a wide range of handicaps. However, the main aim of the
current research was to make an initial investigation concerning
how cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and
threat, relate to affective states among competitive golfers. Future
researcher could restrict the handicap to more elite athletes and
examine the differences between low and high handicap golfers.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the findings of the current study indicate that
irrational beliefs interact with cognitive appraisals and challenge
and threat to determine affective states within golfers. The data
shows that the relationship between cognitive appraisals and
affective states is mediated by irrational beliefs and challenge
or threat. In other words, cognitive appraisals, irrational
beliefs, and challenge and threat, are seen as interacting
antecedents to pre-competitive affective states among golfers.
It is hoped that this study stimulates further research and
discussion concerning cognitive appraisal in anticipation of
competitive situations.
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